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ARGUMENT 
CAROLYNE SIGG HAD BEEN THE SOLE CUSTODIAL 
PARENT OF HER TWO MINOR DAUGHTERS, NICOLA, AGE 
NINE (9) YEARS, AND LINDSAY, AGE FIVE (5) 
YEARS, FOR THE FOUR (4) YEARS IMMEDIATELY 
PRECEDING THE JUNE 14-15, 1994, TRIAL OF THIS 
MATTER AND THE PRIMARY CARETAKER FOR EACH 
CHILD THEIR ENTIRE LIVES. LINDSAY SIGG HAD 
NEVER LIVED WITH HER FATHER, HENRY SIGG, IN 
HER ENTIRE LIFE ON MORE THAN A TEMPORARY 
BASIS. BY EVERY ACCOUNT, INCLUDING THE 
CUSTODY EVALUATOR, DR. ELIZABETH STEWART, THE 
CHILDREN WERE VERY HAPPY, WELL ADJUSTED, 
SOCIALLY, PHYSICALLY, AND ACADEMICALLY, AND 
ACHIEVING HIGH MARKS IN SCHOOL. CONTRARY TO 
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN, SOLELY IN 
VINDICATION OF HENRY SIGG'S PERCEIVED 
"RIGHTS," JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG GRANTED HENRY 
SIGG'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION, CHANGING 
PERMANENT CUSTODY FROM CAROLYN SIGG TO HENRY 
SIGG BASED COMPLETELY ON ALLEGED INTERFERENCE 
WITH VISITATION. IN AN ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE 
THE COURT OF APPEALS TO UPHOLD JUDGE YOUNG'S 
ERRONEOUS RULING, HENRY SIGG'S BRIEF MIS-
CHARACTERIZES AND MISSTATES THE FACTS AND LAW 
AND UNDERSCORES THE CLEAR ERROR OF JUDGE 
YOUNG'S RULING. 
I. 
HENRY SIGG'S BRIEF MISSTATES AND MISCHARACTER-
IZES THE FACTS AND LAW. 
Carolyne Sigg's testimony was virtually 180° opposite of 
the vast majority of Henry Sigg's testimony on all critical 
factors. Much of her testimony has been presented in the portion 
of Appellant's Brief entitled "FACTS" and, as a result, will not be 
reiterated in rebuttal to the "STATEMENT OF FACTS" Henry Sigg's 
Brief. However, there are significant portions of Appellee's 
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"STATEMENT OF CASE" and "STATEMENT OF FACTS" which simply misstate 
or mischaracterize the facts of this case which was decided 
primarily on oral testimony of Carolyne and Henry Sigg and a badly 
flawed child custody evaluation which cannot be supported by the 
record. 
A. MISSTATEMENTS CONTAINED IN "STATEMENT OF THE CASE." 
Regarding Henry Sigg's Verified Petition for Modification filed 
November 13, 1992, on page 1, Mr. Sigg states: 
Based on Ms. Sigg's representations that the 
interference would cease, on July 2, 1993, the 
parties stipulated to the dismissal of the 
First Petition and Counterclaim. 
The Stipulation and Order Dismissing the Petition (R. 
471-472), attached as ADDENDUM I, contains no representation by 
Carolyne Sigg regarding interference with visitation since none was 
occurring. The statement in Henry Sigg's Brief is purely an 
imaginative way of dealing with the facts. However, the voluntary 
dismissal of the "Petition for Modification" points out a critical 
inconsistency between the contentions of Henry Sigg, which served 
as a fundamental basis for the ruling of the Court, and the true 
facts of this case. 
Henry Sigg filed the Petition for Modification November 
13, 1992, and voluntarily dismissed the Petition July 2, 1993. 
This time frame covers the period when Henry Sigg, in the Petition 
for Modification now before the Court, alleges that Carolyne Sigg 
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interfered with his visitation rights by temporarily visiting New 
Zealand (although the Decree of Divorce specifically contemplates 
Carolyn Sigg residing in New Zealand at paragraph 2, R. 357), 
allegedly failing to allow telephone communication, and failing to 
transmit school and medical records and generally making contact 
with the children almost impossible. The voluntary dismissal of 
the Petition for Modification by Henry Sigg is a clear statement 
that Henry Sigg, as of July 2, 1993, did not have a sufficient 
basis to pursue modification of the Decree or pursue allegations of 
interference with visitation based upon the alleged incidents 
during the period of November 23, 1992, to July 2, 1993. The 
Voluntary Dismissal of the Petition on July 2, 1993, is consistent 
with the finding of the New Zealand Court on December 18, 1992, 
that Henry Sigg's Petition for an Order of Father's Right to Access 
to Children and to Return to the United States had no merit, and 
the visitations which Henry Sigg had March 19-28, April 15-20, May 
28-June 2, and June 22-August 28, 1993. [Tr. 92; 257-59; 50] Mr. 
Sigg's current claim of interference with visitation during 
November, 1992, to July 2, 1993, is simply without merit. 
B. MISSTATEMENTS AND MISCHARACTERIZATIONS. 
1. Statement of Facts. In page 5, paragraph 7: 
Mr. Sigg had no visitation with the 
minor children during Christmas 
during 1992 or 1993; Thanksgiving in 
3 
1991, 1992 or 1993; or Father's Day 
in 1991, 1992 or 1993. 
Mr. Sigg voluntarily departed New Zealand 
December 18, 1993, the day the New Zealand Court rejected his 
Petition for Order of Father's Right of Access precluding 
visitation on Christmas, 1993. [Tr. 44, 46] On cross-examination, 
Henry Sigg states that he did not receive visitation on Father's 
Day for only 1993 and 1992. [Tr. 174]. Additionally, paragraph 7 
points out the many other holidays which Henry Sigg presumably had 
open visitation during 1992 and 1993. 
2. Page 5, paragraph 9: 
Mr Sigg was required to attempt 
telephone visitation with the minor 
children through a business 
telephone number and answering 
machine of Mr. Haynes. 
This statement is not made with regard to any 
time frame and is an attempt at misrepresenting the real telephone 
contact between Henry Sigg and his children. Henry Sigg admits 
that he really cannot recollect whether he called Mr. Haynes' 
business telephone or Carolyne Sigg's home telephone and whether 
there was an answering machine during 1993. [Tr. 187-88] In 
contrast, Carolyne Sigg indicates that when she returned from New 
Zealand to Boulder, Colorado, in February, 1993, the only telephone 
in her home was a private line and she maintained no answering 
machine and made no restrictions could talk with Henry Sigg during 
4 
months she resided in the condominium. [Tr. 
Page 7, paragraph 15: 
Mrs. Sigg, in the entire five week 
period while in New Zealand, saw his 
children on only one occasion in the 
presence of Ms. Sigg and Ms. Sigg';s 
father for a period of less than two 
hours even though requests for 
visitation alone with his children 
were continuously made by Mr. Sigg. 
The reason which visitation was supervised in 
New Zealand was that Henry Sigg had on several occasions threatened 
to kidnap Lindsay and Nicola. In recognition of this fact, the 
Divorce Decree states that Henry Sigg must receive consent from 
Carolyne Sigg to take the children out of the country. [R. 357] 
4. Page 8, paragraph 18: 
In an attempt to hide the 
cohabitation from Mr. Sigg, Ms. Sigg 
rented another condominium in the 
same complex. Ms. Sigg, Mr. Haynes 
and the minor children continued to 
eat together; Ms. Sigg and Mr. 
Haynes slept together and had sexual 
intercourse; Ms. Sigg and Mr. Haynes 
had free access to or a key to each 
condominium; Ms. Sigg and Mr. Haynes 
shared certain living expenses; Mr. 
Sigg was required to place telephone 
calls for telephone visitation with 
the minor children to Mr. Haynes7 
business telephone number; Ms. Sigg 
and Mr. Haynes maintained certain 
clothing in each condominium; the 
furniture in both condominiums was 
used by Mr. Haynes and Ms. Sigg. 
the entire six (6) 
256; 187] 
3. 
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Paragraph 18 explicitly misstates Carolyne 
Sigg's testimony regarding her living in a condominium separate 
from Vic Haynes from the end of February, 1993, through the end of 
August, 1993. Her entire testimony on the issue is contained in 
the transcript at pp. 227-35, which is attached as Addendum II. 
Her testimony is: She leased the condominium for six months (Tr. 
230); she purchased the furniture for the condominium and Vic 
Haynes loaned her a couch (Tr. 231); he slept there "from time to 
time," and on those occasions, they had sexual intercourse (Tr. 
232); Mr. Haynes never paid for food or utilities but may have 
brought over milk or orange juice (Tr. 232-33); he had free access 
to the condominium and "he always knocked (Tr. 233); he had no 
clothes at Carolyne Sigg's condominium (Tr. 233); he kept his 
clothes at his own condominium (Tr. 234). Additionally, contrary 
to the assertion in Appellee's paragraph 18, there is absolutely no 
statement that Mr. Sigg was required to place telephone calls for 
telephone visitation with the minor children with Mr. Haynes' 
business telephone number. 
5. Page 8, paragraph 19: The citation to the 
transcript pp. 235-237 does not relate to any statement in 
paragraph 19; therefore, Appellee's paragraph 19 is unsupported by 
the record. 
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6. Page 10, paragraph 24: Mr, Sigg's arrest was 
the independent action of the Boulder City Attorney arising from 
Henry Sigg's abusive telephone calls and continued harassment of 
Carolyne Sigg over a lengthy period of time. 
Comments regarding Dr. Elizabeth Stewart's custody 
evaluation: 
7. Page 11, paragraph 27: 
Dr. Stewart noted that Ms. Sigg's 
"pattern of interfering with 
visitation rather than facilitating 
it and her use of other people in 
this effort has continued for at 
least a year and a half..." 
Dr. Stewart recognized that there were only two 
five-month periods, from the end of August, 1992, through February, 
1993, and the end of August, 1993, through January, 1994, that 
Henry Sigg had not had actual, physical visitation with his 
children, for a total of ten (10) months out of forty-eight (48) 
months of Carolyne Sigg's custody. [Tr. 125-26] Henry Sigg's 
voluntary dismissal of the Petition for Modification filed November 
13, 1992, on July 2, 1993, is an emphatic declaration that no basis 
existed during that time frame for the allegations of interference 
with visitation. 
8. Page 12, paragraph 34: 
The children are closely bonded with 
each of their parents... 
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Dr. Stewart's recommendation crystallizes the 
point that Carolyne Sigg has been an excellent parent to Lindsay 
and Nicola since she has been the primary care giver and the sole 
custodial parent of both children during the prior four (4) years 
prior to the evaluation and fostered the conditions which promoted 
the close bonding with Henry Sigg. Additionally, Dr. Stewart's 
recognition that the children are closely bonded with each parent 
after Carolyne Sigg has been the primary care giver and sole 
custodian is directly contrary to her position that "the 
probability of a healthy relationship being fostered with both 
parents will be enhanced if Mr. Sigg is the custodial parent." 
r Recommendations 1-8] 
9. Page 13, paragraph 3 5: 
The custody and visitation 
arrangements worked well during the 
first fifteen months following the 
parties' divorce, but deteriorated 
steadily since Ms. Sigg departed 
with the children to Colorado and 
New Zealand and she failed to 
facilitate visitation with the 
children except on her terms which 
are not in their best interests. 
The record is directly contrary to Elizabeth 
Stewart's statements. In 1993, Henry Sigg had very significant 
visitation, in fact more than the sixty (60) days required by the 
Decree of Divorce: March 19-28; April 15-20; May 28-June 2 (Tr. 
92; 295-97); June 22-August 28, 1993 (Tr. 50). On all four (4) 
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occasions when Henry Sigg exercised visitation, he returned the 
children from two (2) to five (5)days late which certainly makes it 
appear that the visitation was more on his terms rather than on 
Carolyne Sigg's terms. 
10. Page 13, paragraph 37: 
The environment offered by Mr. Sigg is a 
stable one with permanent employment, a 
satisfactory remarriage relationship and 
extended family and friends with whom the 
parties' minor children are acquainted. 
Mr. Sigg testified that as of June 6, 1994, he 
had been employed as a project manager for a construction job, but 
that during 1993, his income was derived from Mountain Tops, a 
clothing company which was then in significant financial difficulty 
to the point of Mr. Sigg considering bankruptcy; Mr. Sigg's 1993 
tax return showed his income for the year as negative $28,000.00. 
[Tr 205-08] Mr. Sigg's "satisfactory remarriage" occurred in 
January, 1994, merely five (5) months before the trial. Dr. 
Stewart makes a significant leap of faith in her description of the 
short marriage. The "extended family" living in Park City is Henry 
Sigg's sister who moved to Park City in October, 1993, with her two 
children. 
11. Page 13, paragraph 38, sets forth Dr. Stewart's 
recommendation which is totally based on one factor which she 
apparently views as the most important: Her perception that 
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Carolyne Sigg interfered with Henry Sigg's visitation. Dr. 
Stewart's perception or interference with visitation is completely 
inaccurate since Henry Sigg has always received sixty (60) days or 
more per year of visitation as required by the Divorce Decree. 
However, the interference with visitation is the driving force of 
the Recommendation that it is in the best interests of the children 
to change permanent custody to Henry Sigg. 
Contrary to Dr. Stewart's position is the 
following regarding Carolyne Sigg at the date of trial: 
a. Carolyne Sigg has been Lindsay's and 
Nicola's primary care giver since birth, nine (9) and four (4) 
years, respectively. 
b. Carolyne Sigg has been the sole custodial 
parent for four (4) years prior to the trial. 
c. Carolyn Sigg has been an extraordinarily 
attentive mother attending performances, school activities, 
cheerleading work shops, dance and gymnastics and baseball games, 
transporting her children to and from every activity, attending 
every performance and volunteers regularly for classroom work, 
reading to them at night, and providing the most positive parenting 
available. 
d. Nicola and Lindsay are socially well 
adjusted, are doing very well in school, have several friends in 
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Boulder, Colorado, are "closely bonded with each parent," as 
recognized by Dr. Stewart, Judge Young, Henry Sigg and Henry Sigg's 
witnesses, Anna La Grange and Teri Santy. 
Also contrary to the "best interests of the 
children" recommendation of Dr. Stewart transferring custody to 
Henry Sigg, is the following regarding Henry Sigg: 
a. Henry Sigg failed to pay child support and 
alimony from April, 1992, through March, 1993, but finally caught 
up in a lump-sum payment. [Tr. 289] 
b. Henry Sigg failed to pay child support and 
alimony from May, 1993, through January, 1994, but finally caught 
up with a lump-sum payment in January, 1994, after an Order to Show 
Cause was filed. [Tr. 28i; R. 574-75] 
c. Henry Sigg was charged by the Park City 
Police with assaulting Carolyne Sigg in January, 1991 (Tr. 246); 
d. Henry Sigg has physically abused Carolyne 
Sigg both during their marriage and after their divorce and his 
daughter, Nicola (Tr. 245-46). 
e. By Orders of the Court dated September 4, 
1990 (R. 53-56), November 2, 1990 (R. 109-11), April 3, 1991 (R. 
323-31), Henry Sigg was restrained and enjoined from physically 
abusing, harassing or annoying Carolyne Sigg. 
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f. From 1990 through 1994, Henry Sigg has 
consistently verbally abused and harassed Carolyne Sigg, and 
specifically in 1993, he used such foul and abusive language on the 
telephone with both Carolyne Sigg and her children that he was too 
embarrassed to repeat his statements in Court. [Tr. 189-90] As a 
result, he was charged by the Boulder City attorney with telephone 
harassment and arrested December 20, 1993. 
g. It was impossible to communicate with 
Henry Sigg regarding visitation because of his consistently 
aggressive posture and foul and abusive language. However, it is 
Dr. Stewart's position that the name calling and foul and abuse 
language while dealing with visitation was not detrimental to 
arranging visitation. [Tr. 123] 
Judge Young and Dr. Stewart totally ignored the best 
interests of Lindsay and Nicola Sigg. 
II. 
THERE WAS NO INTERFERENCE WITH VISITATION 
RIGHT CREATING SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCE AND THE "BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILDREN- DETERMINATION WAS CLEAR ERROR. 
Henry Sigg's Brief fails to address critical factors 
raised in Carolyne Sigg's Brief regarding the substantial-change-
in-circumstance issue, points out the clear error of Judge Young's 
ruling and provides a fictionalized rendition of the facts of the 
case inconsistent with the record. 
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A. THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES HENRY SIGG HAS ALWAYS 
RECEIVED APPROPRIATE VISITATION. Since his divorce from Carolyne 
Sigg, Henry Sigg has received annually at least sixty (60) physical 
days of visitation ordered by paragraph 2 of the Decree of Divorce. 
[R. 357] Prior to the June 14-15, 1994, trial, the Petition filed 
by Henry Sigg relating to modification was voluntarily dismissed 
and the New Zealand Petition found to be without a basis and 
dismissed. There has never been a finding that Carolyne Sigg is in 
contempt of the Court ordered visitation schedule because Henry 
Sigg has always received sufficient visitation. While Elizabeth 
Stewart's erroneous position at trial was that Carolyne Sigg should 
be required to provide more physical visitation than is ordered by 
the Court and upon failure to accord additional visitation custody 
should change, the simple fact is that Henry Sigg has always 
received the Court-ordered visitation. That issue was simply not 
addressed by Henry Sigg's Brief. 
Appellee's citing of Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1990), underscores the error of Judge Young's ruling 
and the weakness of Henry Sigg's position. As recognized by Henry 
Sigg/ "This Court has held that visitation interference 'may be a 
factor relevant to the issues of both a change in circumstances and 
the child's best interest.'" Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 410 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1990); Brief of Appellee, page 17. Unfortunately, 
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Judge Young and Elizabeth Stewart allowed the alleged interference 
with telephone visitation privileges and visitation days in excess 
of that ordered by the Court to be the controlling factor showing 
a substantial change in circumstance and warranting a complete 
change in custody under the "best interests" guidelines. Judge 
Young's ruling is clearly erroneous under Utah law. Davis v. 
Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988); Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 
604 (Utah 1989); Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 54 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). 
Under the language quoted by Henry Sigg from the 
Smith case, Elizabeth Stewart's findings support Carolyne Sigg 
remaining the custodial parent. In her Recommendations, Elizabeth 
Stewart finds that the children are closely bonded with both 
parents. As stated in the Smith case, at P. 410 and quoted by 
Henry Sigg: 
The best interests of the minor child are 
promoted by having the child respect and 
love both parents. Fostering a child's 
relationship with the non-custodial 
parent has an important bearing on the 
child's best interest. Dana v. Dana, 789 
P.2d 726, 730 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990). 
Visitation by a non-custodial parent 
helps to develop this bonding of respect 
and love. 
Carolyne Sigg has been the custodial parent who 
developed and fostered that close bonding with both parents, as 
found by Elizabeth Stewart. That was a fact current as of the date 
of trial. 
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Elizabeth Stewart's forecast that Henry Sigg would 
better develop a healthy relationship between the children and both 
parents was nothing more than speculation about a future event for 
which Dr. Stewart had no basis in fact, especially considering 
Henry Sigg's irresponsible behavior of non-payment of child support 
and alimony, consistent harassment and abuse of Carolyne Sigg, and 
inappropriate expressions of anger. 
Finally, it should be noted that much of the "facts" 
contained in the argument section of Henry Sigg's Brief regarding 
custody is not supported by the record and is pure fictionalization 
such as: 
Ms. Sigg returned to Colorado and 
essentially cut off all telephone, mail 
and physical visitation with the minor 
children. After not having seen the 
children for months and not being able to 
communicate with them except through a 
telephone answering machine... 
Henry Sigg received visitation with the children 
March 19-28; April 15-20; May 28-June 2, 1993 (Tr. 92; 295-97); 
June 22-August 28, 1993 (Tr. 50). There has never been an 
allegation in the record that the children did not receive mail. 
The issue with reaching the children by telephone in Ms. Sigg's 
condominium from late February through late August, 1993, has 
previously been addressed, rReply Brief of Appellant, p. 4] 
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Likewise, Judge Young's ruling that there has been 
a substantial change in circumstance based solely on alleged 
interference with visitation is simply clear error. 
B. THE RULING OF CHANGE OF CUSTODY IS CONTRARY TO THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN. The contrast and comparison 
between Carolyne Sigg and Henry Sigg and the children's positive 
physical and mental states at the time of the trial have previously 
been addressed, rReply Brief of Appellant, pp 9-11] Judge Young 
and Elizabeth Stewart simply chose to vindicate Henry Sigg's 
claimed injury of not receiving visitation in excess of those days 
to which he was entitled under the Decree of Divorce and some 
limitations on telephone contact as a result of his foul and 
abusive messages to the children and Ms. Sigg rather than dealing 
with the best interests of the children. 
C. LEGISLATIVE PREFERENCE FOR ALLEGED INTERFERENCE WITH 
VISITATION. Under House Bill 36, the Utah Legislature adopted § 
78-32-12.2, as an amendment to Utah Code Annotated, § 30-3-5, in 
the 1995 legislative session. A copy of HB 36 is attached as 
Addendum III, and §78-32-12.2 is attached as Addendum IV. Section 
78-32-12.2 creates a judicial remedy for situations similar to 
those alleged by Henry Sigg under "substantial non-compliance" with 
Court orders. "Substantial non-compliance" is defined as: 
(i) substantially interferes with a court 
ordered visitation schedule; or 
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(ii) interferes with parent's right to 
frequent, meaningful and continuing access 
with his child and which substantially impairs 
that parent-child relationship. 
Section 78-32-12.2 creates mandatory sanctions which the 
Judge must impose upon a finding of "substantial non-compliance," 
including the awarding of actual attorney's fees and costs, make-up 
of visitation, a minimum of ten (10) hours community service, and 
a Permanent Injunction enjoining non-compliance. However, it is 
very clear from the legislation that these sanctions are the 
legislatively preferred method of dealing with allegations of 
interference with visitation in stark contrast to changing 
permanent custody. 
Section 78-32-12.2 mirrors the position taken by Carolyne 
Sigg during this entire matter: that in the event Judge Young 
believed there was significant interference with visitation rights, 
the appropriate sanction was a form of contempt rather than 
transferring child custody based upon interference. Judge Young's 
Modification of the Decree by transferring permanent custody is 
clear error. 
III. 
THERE IS NO STATUTORY OR COMMON-LAW BASIS FOR 
JUDGE YOUNG'S ATTORNEY FEE AWARD. 
On February 24, 1993, Henry Sigg filed a Verified 
Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce. [R. 475-89; Tr. 4] 
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Judge Young granted the Petition for Modification June 15, 1994, 
changing custody of Lindsay and Nicola Sigg and awarding attorney's 
fees in the amount of $14,000.00; expert fees in the amount of 
$3,000.00; and attorney's fees for the defense of the Colorado 
criminal action in the amount of $1,000.00. The award of these 
fees is totally without statutory or common-law basis. 
The sole statute upon which Henry Sigg relies in his 
Brief as a basis for the fee awards is §78-32-12.2 (1994). 
However, §78-32-12.2 was adopted solely as a pilot program in the 
First Judicial District beginning July 1, 1993, and running to July 
1, 1994, and was generally not in effect in the State of Utah on 
the date of the trial in the Third District, June 14-15, 1994. 
[See Utah Code Annotated §78-32-12.2(14) and §78-32-12.3] The Utah 
code does not contain a statute upon which Henry Sigg can base 
Judge Young's erroneous award of fees on the Petition for 
Modification. 
Each of the cases cited by Henry Sigg's Brief at P. 23 do 
not relate to Petitions for Modification in any respect. Each case 
arises from an Order to Show Cause wherein sanctions were granted 
by the Court for failure to observe the Decree of Divorce. As 
such, the cases cited cannot be relied upon as basis for granting 
fees based upon Henry Sigg's Petition for Modification. 
18 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF CHILD CARE COSTS IS 
CLEAR ERROR. 
Henry Sigg argued that the trial Court's award of child 
costs is equitable. However, it is clearly contrary to the 
evidence in the record and an abuse of discretion. 
The sole and unrebutted testimony on the issue of child 
care came from Carolyne Sigg who testified that in order for her to 
conduct her business from her residence, it was necessary for her 
to temporarily place Lindsay Sigg part-time in pre-school so that 
Carolyne could have uninterrupted access to her clients. Nicola 
never attended pre-school. In total disregard of that testimony, 
Judge Young ruled that Carolyne Sigg should be solely responsible 
for one-third of the day-care costs and that the balance of the 
day-care costs should be split one-half to Henry Sigg and one-half 
to Carolyne Sigg. Carolyne Sigg's testimony is the sole evidence 
on the reasonableness of the amounts spent for day care and was 
totally disregarded by Judge Young in his arbitrary ruling: 
Now I have no great basis to determine upon 
which, how much of this should or should not 
be allowed, and so I am going to make a 
decision... 
Judge Young's ruling totally discounts Carolyne Sigg's 
testimony that she needed the time alone to adequately perform her 
job and points out the Court's negative and unfounded attitude 
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towards Carolyne Sigg that she did not tell the truth and even if 
she did, the Court would not listen. 
V. 
HENRY SIGG'S DISTORTION OF FACTS REGARDING CO-
HABITATION UNDERSCORES THE POSITION THAT THE 
RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE 
COURT. 
Henry Sigg badly distorts the facts contained in the 
trial record in an ill conceived attempt to support Judge Young's 
erroneous Findings of Fact and ruling on cohabitation. It is ill 
conceived in that Carolyne Sigg's testimony is the sole unrebutted 
evidence on the point and the misstatements of fact are obvious 
from her abbreviated testimony. [Tr. 227-35; Addendum II] 
Carolyne Sigg's testimony unequivocally establishes that she and 
Vic Haynes did not share a common residence, i.e., "the sharing of 
a common abode that both parties consider their principal domicile 
for more than a temporary or brief of time." Haddow v. Haddow, 707 
P.2d 669, 672 (Utah 1985). 
The several and gross misstatements and 
mischaracterizations of the facts contained in Henry Sigg's 
argument in Brief of Appellee, pp. 28-29 are: 
1. Ms. Sigg and Mr. Haynes resided together 
for approximately one week in August 1992 
in Colorado;two weeks in December 1992-
January 1993 in New Zealand; continuously 
after February 1993 in Colorado either in 
the same condominium or in condominiums 
that were within a few doors of each 
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other; and, of course, they resided in 
the same residence after August 1993. 
The term "resided together" is a complete misuse of 
the term as applied to the facts since "one-week" and "two-week" 
periods do not constitute "residency" under Haddow. Also see, 
Knuteson v. Knuteson, 619 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1980). Henry Sigg 
fails to state that Carolyne Sigg lived with Vic Haynes for a two-
week period, February 13-29, 1993, upon her return from New 
Zealand. After the two-week period, Carolyne Sigg leased a 
condominium two blocks away from Vic Haynes' condominium for a six-
month period beginning late February and running August 29, 1993. 
[Tr. 229-30] 
2. Mr. Sigg mischaracterizes the evidence by failing to 
state that Ms. Sigg and the children moved in with Mr. Haynes for 
a two-week period during which time they "ate, slept and otherwise 
lived in his condominium. fBrief of Appellee, Para. 2, P. 28] 
3. The record does not contain the quotation cited by 
Mr. Haynes. Carolyne Sigg testified that during the two-week 
period, she and Vic Haynes had sexual intercourse. [Tr. L. 18-25, 
228; L. 1, 229] 
4. The first sentence of paragraph 4 contains unfounded 
speculations that Carolyne Sigg was engaged in "an attempt to hide 
the cohabitation from Mr. Sigg" and in the second sentence, the 
expression of an apparent expert on the topic that "the use of two 
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residences is an oft-times used ploy of those cohabiting." The 
balance of the paragraph contains the following explicit 
misstatements: 
Ms. Sigg and Mr. Haynes shared living 
expenses; Mr. Sigg was required to place 
telephone calls for telephone visitation 
with the minor children to Mr. Haynes' 
business number at the condominium; 
Ms.Sigg and Mr. Haynes maintained certain 
clothing in each condominium; the 
furniture in both condominiums was used 
by Mr. Haynes and Ms. Sigg. 
Carolyne Sigg's accurate testimony is that she 
purchased furniture for the condominium and Vic Haynes loaned her 
a couch to use (Tr. 231); Vic Haynes slept there "from time to 
time," and on those occasions, they had sexual intercourse (Tr. 
232); Mr. Haynes never paid for food or utilities but may have 
brought over milk or orange juice (Tr. 232-33); he had free had 
access to the condominium but "he always knocked" (Tr. 233); Vic 
Haynes had no clothes at Carolyne Sigg's condominium (Tr. 233); he 
kept his clothes at his own condominium (Tr. 234). There is 
virtually no testimony in the cited transcript that Mr. Sigg was 
required to place telephone calls for telephone visitation with the 
minor children to Mr. Haynes' business number at his condominium. 
In fact, Henry Sigg cannot remember whether there was a telephone 
answering machine on the telephone line which he called in the 
Spring of 1993 or the Fall of the 1993, had Carolyne Sigg and Vic 
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Haynes resided together. [Tr. 189] Carolyne Sigg's testimony on 
the issue is that she maintained a private line in her condominium 
upon which there was no telephone answering machine, message or 
voice mail, and that the children and Henry Sigg had unrestricted 
access through the private telephone line to each other during the 
six months she resided in the condominium, and that Mr. Haynes did 
not have a business line in her condominium. [Tr. 255-56] 
5. Paragraph 5 of Brief of Appellee, page 29, contains 
pure speculation and an unwarranted assumption except for one fact: 
Carolyne Sigg and Vic Haynes moved into a residence together in 
August, 1993. 
The record does not support Findings of Fact numbers 5, 
6, 7, 9, 10, and 12. Under Utah case law, Carolyne Sigg did not 
cohabit with Vic Haynes until the end of August, 1993. Haddow v. 
Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
Lindsay and Nicola Sigg are the children whose best 
interest Judge Young was required to hold above all else in this 
custody decision. At the time of trial, Lindsay and Nicola Sigg, 
by all accounts, were happy, healthy and well adjusted as a result 
of Carolyne Sigg's primary care giving for five (5) and nine (9) 
years, respectively, and sole custodial care for four (4) years 
immediately prior to the trial. Contrary to Utah law and on the 
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record which is replete with the negative aspects of Henry Sigg's 
character, Judge Young violated his duty to protect these two young 
girls and chose to vindicate the claims of Henry Sigg. Henry 
Sigg's Brief underscores Judge Young's error by resorting to 
mischaracterization of evidence and citation to inapplicable case 
law and statutes. The facts in this case are compelling: Carolyne 
Sigg lost custody of Lindsay and Nicola Sigg despite no substantial 
change in circumstances having occured under Utah law and contrary 
to Lindsay's and Nicola's best interest. Judge Young's ruling 
should » reversed, and Carolyne Sigg should be awarded her costs 
and attorney's fees on appeal. 
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DATED this /P* day of April, 1995. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
ByTvE. Paul Wood, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
Carolyne Sigg 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, this 
day of April, 1995, to: 
Clark W. Sessions, Esq. 
Dean C. Andreasen, Esq. 
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS 
201 South Main, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
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ADDENDUM NO. I: 
STIPULATION AND ORDER DISMISSING 
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
John B. Mason (Bar No. 2111) 
David S. Dolowitz (Bar No. 0899) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
Post Office Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
No. 
stfUfcr* F I L E D 
JUL 2 1993 
Clerk of Summit County 
»r 
DaptfyCtek 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYNE JOAN SIGG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HENRY ALFRED SIGG, 
Defendant. 
STIPULATED MOTION FOR 
WITHDRAWAL OF PETITION TO 
MODIFY AND COUNTERPETITION 
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Civil Number: 10482 
Plaintiff, Carolyne Sigg, on her own behalf, and defendant Henry Alfred Sigg, by and 
through his attorney, John B. Mason, hereby stipulate that both the Verified Petition for 
Modification of Decree of Divorce filed by the defendant and the Answer and Counterclaim filed 
by the plaintiff be dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this _^g^day of June, 1993. 
&v6\yn Sigg (£7 
-Plaintiff 
enry Alfred Sigg 
dant 
N^V^A^O 
lason 
Attorney for Defendant 
B00KPP?A«E229 0 0 u 4 7 j -
O R D E R 
Based upon the foregoing Stipulated Motion for Dismissal of the parties and good cause 
appearing, now therefore 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Verified Petition for Modification of Decree of 
Divorce filed by the defendant and the Answer and Counterclaim filed by the plaintiff be and 
the same are hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this JnJ day of J*a£ 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
- 2 
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ADDENDUM NO. II: 
TESTIMONY OF CAROLYNE SIGG, 
pp. 227-35 
1 Q I'M SORRY, NEW ZEALAND. YOU RETURNED TO 
2 BOULDER, COLORADO. IS THAT SO? 
3 A YES. 
4 Q WHEN WAS THAT, MA'AM? 
5 A FEBRUARY, 1993. 
6 Q WHERE, PHYSICALLY, DID YOU BECOME LOCATED? 
7 WHERE DID YOU MOVE TO? 
8 A WE STAYED AGAIN WITH VICTOR, I BELIEVE, NEARLY 
9 TWO WEEKS AND THEN I FOUND A CONDOMINIUM AND THE GIRLS AND 
10 I MOVED INTO THE CONDOMINIUM. 
11 Q OKAY. DURING THE TIME THAT YOU STAYED WITH MR. 
12 HAYNES, THE TWO-WEEK PERIOD PRIOR TO THE TIME THAT YOU 
13 MOVED INTO THE CONDOMINIUM, DID YOU AND THE GIRLS HAVE 
14 YOUR MEALS THERE? 
15 A YES, WE DID. 
16 Q DID YOU MOVE YOUR PERSONAL EFFECTS AND 
17 BELONGINGS AND THOSE OF YOUR DAUGHTERS' INTO HIS 
18 CONDOMINIUM? 
19 A FROM SALT LAKE CITY? 
20 Q YES, MA'AM. 
21 A NO. 
22 Q DID YOU MOVE THOSE, WEARING APPAREL AND THE 
23 OTHER ITEMS OF PERSONAL PROPERTY THAT YOU BROUGHT WITH YOU 
24 FROM AUSTRALIA INTO HIS CONDOMINIUM? 
25 MS. MAYCOCK: FROM NEW ZEALAND. 
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1 A (BY THE WITNESS) I BROUGHT THE CLOTHES, THE 
2 BAGS THAT WE HAD, AND I BROUGHT THEM INTO THE CONDOMINIUM 
3 WHEN WE CAME FROM NEW ZEALAND. 
4 Q (BY MR. SESSIONS) ALL RIGHT. WHO PAID FOR THE 
5 FOOD EXPENSES WHILE YOU WERE STAYING WITH MR. HAYNES 
6 DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME? 
7 A FOR THE TWO WEEKS? 
8 Q YEAH. 
g A I BELIEVE WE BOTH DID. 
10 Q YOU BOTH SHARED IN THOSE EXPENSES? 
11 A SURE. 
12 Q DID THE TWO OF YOU SHARE IN THE EXPENSES OF 
13 | UTILITIES? 
A NO. 
15 I Q DID THE TWO OF YOU SHARE IN ANY RENT OR MORTGAGE 
15 PAYMENTS ON THOSE PREMISES? 
17 A NOT FOR THE TWO WEEKS, NO. 
18 Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, AS I UNDERSTAND YOUR TESTIMONY, 
19 I IT WAS THAT YOU WERE THERE FOR A TWO-WEEK PERIOD OF TIME. 
DID YOU AND THE GIRLS SLEEP THERE? 
21 I A YES, WE DID. 
22 Q DID YOU SLEEP WITH MR. HAYNES FOR THAT PERIOD OF 
14 
20 
23 TIME? 
24 A YES, I DID. 
25 I Q DID YOU HAVE INTERCOURSE WITH HIM? 
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A YES, I DID. 
Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, YOU THEN 
MOVED INTO A CONDOMINIUM UNIT AT ANOTHER ADDRESS. 
A YES, I DID. 
Q CAN YOU GIVE US THAT ADDRESS, PLEASE? 
A 3000 RED STONE LANE. 
Q 3003? 
A 3000 RED STONE LANE. 
Q CAN YOU TELL THE COURT, PLEASE, WHERE THAT 
RESIDENCE WAS LOCATED IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE RESIDENCE OF 
MR. HAYNES ON CRIPPLE CREEK? 
A A GOOD TWO BLOCKS AWAY. 
Q WOULD IT BE FAIR TO SAY THAT THAT RESIDENCE WAS 
IN THE SAME PROJECT OR DEVELOPMENT? 
A I THINK IT WAS IN THE SAME PROJECT. THERE WERE 
PROBABLY OVER 100 UNITS IN THAT PROJECT, OVER ABOUT AN 
EIGHT ACRE AREA. 
Q WAS THERE SOME PARTICULAR REASON YOU CHOSE THAT 
LOCATION IN BOULDER AS OPPOSED TO SOME OTHER LOCATION? 
A I HAD PUT NICKIE INTO THE SCHOOL. IT WAS JUST 
DOWN THE ROAD SO I SPECIFICALLY WANTED A CONDOMINIUM IN 
THE AREA SO SHE COULD CONTINUE AT THE SCHOOL WE'D STARTED 
HER IN. 
24 I Q CAN YOU GIVE US THE DATE YOU MOVED IN THAT 
25 I CONDOMINIUM? 
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A IT WAS THE END OF FEBRUARY. THE SPECIFIC DATE I 
WOULD HAVE TO LOOK AT THE LEASE. 
Q AND THAT WOULD BE FEBRUARY OF 1993? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q DID YOU LEASE OR PURCHASE THAT RESIDENCE? 
A I LEASED IT. 
Q WHAT WAS THE TERM OF THE LEASE? 
A IT WAS A SIX-MONTH LEASE RENEWABLE AT THE END OF 
THE SIX MONTHS. 
Q DID YOU, IN FACT, RENEW IT AT THE END OF SIX 
MONTHS? 
A 
Q 
RIGHT? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
NO. 
IN OTHER WORDS, YOU GAVE THE UNIT UP; IS THAT 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
WHERE DID YOU MOVE TO NEXT? 
VIC AND I BOUGHT THE HOUSE ON 850 LINDON AVENUE. 
WHEN? 
AUGUST, 1993. 
HELP ME JUST A SECOND. THE LEASE ON THE CONDO-
MINIUM ON RED RIDGE [SIC] STONE RAN FROM FEBRUARY UNTIL 
WHEN? 
A SIX MONTHS. THROUGH AUGUST. 
Q TO AUGUST. 
A THROUGH AUGUST, I BELIEVE. 
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Q AND YOU MOVED THEN FROM THAT UNIT DIRECTLY INTO 
THE RESIDENCE THAT YOU AND MR. HAYNES ACQUIRED AND 
PURCHASED? IS THAT SO? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q ALL RIGHT. NOW, BACKING UP TO THE LEASED 
PROPERTY THAT YOU'VE TOLD US ABOUT ON RIDGE [SIC] STONE 
LANE, DID YOU MOVE FURNITURE IN THAT PARTICULAR UNIT? 
A I PURCHASED FURNITURE TO MOVE INTO THAT UNIT. 
Q AND I TAKE IT, THE FURNITURE WAS FOR YOU AND THE 
TWO GIRLS? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q DID MR. HAYNES HAVE ANY OF HIS FURNITURE AT THAT 
LOCATION AT ANY TIME DURING THE LEASE PERIOD? 
A MR. HAYNES LOANED ME A COUCH THAT HE HAD EXTRA. 
APART FROM THAT I BOUGHT EVERYTHING ELSE. 
Q DID MR. HAYNES SHARE MEALS WITH YOU AT THAT 
ADDRESS? 
A YES, HE DID. 
Q HOW OFTEN DID YOU SEE MR. HAYNES DURING THE 
PERIOD OF TIME YOU WERE LEASING THE RIDGE [SIC] STONE LANE 
PROPERTY? 
A OFTEN. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I THOUGHT IT WAS RED STONE. 
MR. SESSIONS: IS IT? 
THE WITNESS: R-E-D. 
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JUDGE YOUNG: IT'S A NEW ZEALAND RED. 
MR. SESSIONS: I CAN SEE THAT, JUDGE. 
Q (BY MR. SESSIONS) AT THE RED STONE LANE 
PROPERTY. HOW OFTEN DID YOU SEE MR. HAYNES WHILE YOU 
LIVED THERE? 
A OFTEN. 
Q HOW OFTEN WOULD THAT BE, MA'AM? 
A AT LEAST--MOST DAYS, UNLESS HE WAS AWAY ON A 
ROAD TRIP OR AT A TRADE SHOW OR OUT ON THE ROAD. 
Q DID HE SLEEP THERE FROM TIME TO TIME? 
A YES, HE DID. 
Q WITH YOU? 
A YES. 
Q DID YOU HAVE INTERCOURSE WITH HIM ON THOSE 
OCCASIONS? 
A YES, I DID. 
Q AND THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER THE ENTIRE PERIOD 
OF THE SIX MONTHS THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT, THAT IS 
FEBRUARY TO AUGUST. 
A YES. 
Q DID MR. HAYNES IN ANY WAY ASSIST YOU WITH ANY 
EXPENSES AT THAT ADDRESS SUCH AS FOOD OR UTILITIES, ANY-
THING LIKE THAT? 
A NO, NOT THAT I RECALL. HE PROBABLY MADE SOME 
CONTRIBUTIONS OCCASIONALLY OF SOME FOOD OR BOUGHT SOME 
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MILK OR ORANGE JUICE BUT I PAID FOR MOST THINGS MYSELF. 
Q DID HE PARK HIS CAR THERE FROM TIME TO TIME? 
A MAYBE FROM TIME TO TIME. 
Q DID HE HAVE A KEY TO THE APARTMENT, MA'AM? 
A I'M TRYING TO REMEMBER AS HONESTLY AS I CAN. WE 
HAD A KEY OUTSIDE. PROBABLY. 
Q PROBABLY? 
A YES. 
Q LET ME REPHRASE THE QUESTION THIS WAY. 
DID HE HAVE FREE ACCESS TO THE APARTMENT? 
A YES. 
Q EITHER BY WAY OF A KEY THAT HE HAD HIMSELF OR A 
KEY THAT WAS LEFT OUTSIDE? 
A YES. I WOULD FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE SAYING THAT. 
Q AND THAT ACCESS WOULD HAVE BEEN UNRESTRICTED, 
WOULDN'T IT? HE COULD COME OR GO AT ANY TIME DURING THE 
DAY OR NIGHT. 
A HE WAS ALWAYS WELCOME. HE ALWAYS KNOCKED. 
Q DID HE TAKE PHONE CALLS ON THE TELEPHONE IN THAT 
20
 | RESIDENCE DURING THE PERIOD IT WAS UNDER LEASE? 
21
 I A NOT VERY OFTEN. 
22
 I Q DID HE USE THE TELEPHONE TO CALL OUT? 
23
 A PROBABLY OCCASIONALLY. 
24
 I Q DID HE HAVE CLOTHES AT THAT RESIDENCE? 
A NO. 
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Q 
COUPLE OF 
A 
Q 
MA'AM? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE HE KEPT THOSE AT THE PLACE A 
BLOCKS OR WHATEVER AWAY? IS THAT SO? 
I KNOW HE DID. 
DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME WERE YOU WORKING, 
YES, I WAS. 
WHERE? 
I WAS WORKING FOR VIC HAYNES. 
DID YOU DO ANY BUSINESS, CONDUCT ANY BUSINESS 
ACTIVITIES OUT OF THE RED STONE LANE ADDRESS? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
YES. 
DID MR. HAYNES? 
DID MR. HAYNES--
CONDUCT ANY OF HIS BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OUT OF 
THAT ADDRESS? 
A YES--EXCUSE ME. I THINK I JUST MISUNDERSTOOD 
YOUR QUESTION. DID HE CONDUCT--DID HE CONDUCT IT AT THE 
HOUSE AT 
ME? 
Q 
A 
3000 RED STONE LANE? IS THAT WHAT YOU'RE ASKING 
YES, MA'AM. 
NO, HE DID NOT. WHEN YOU SAID "OUT OF" I 
THOUGHT YOU MEANT OUT OF--
Q 
A 
LANE. 
YOU MEANT AWAY? 
YES. HE DID NOT CONDUCT BUSINESS AT RED STONE 
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1 MR. SESSIONS: I THINK THAT'S ALL, MS. SIGG. 
2 YOUR HONOR, I WILL HAVE OTHER QUESTIONS WHEN 
3 CROSS-EXAMINATION TIME COMES, BUT FOR PURPOSES OF DIRECT 
4 EXAMINATION, AT THIS POINT, THAT'S ALL I HAVE. 
5 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. ANY CROSS AT THIS 
6 TIME? 
7 MS. MAYCOCK: NO. BUT MAY I CONTINUE ON WITH 
8 DIRECT EXAMINATION AT THIS TIME? 
9 JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU ANTICIPATE OTHER WITNESSES? 
10 MR. SESSIONS: I DO NOT. AND AT THIS POINT WE 
11 REST. 
12 JUDGE YOUNG: EXCEPT THE ISSUE OF FEES. 
13 MR. SESSIONS: YEAH. I ASSUMED WE WERE GOING TO 
14 HOLD THAT. 
15 JUDGE YOUNG: AFFIDAVIT? 
16 MR. SESSIONS: AS I HAD EARLIER INDICATED, BY 
17 AFFIDAVIT, AND PROVIDE THE COURT A BREAKDOWN, FURTHER 
18 BREAKDOWN. I HAVE ALL THE BILLS AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO 
19 SUBMIT THAT LATER. 
20 JUDGE YOUNG: YOU HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT 
21 PROCEDURE? 
22 MS. MAYCOCK: THAT'S FINE. 
23 JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. ALL RIGHT. THE DEFEN-
24 DANT IN THIS CASE, THE MOVING PETITIONER, THEN RESTS. 
25 YOU MAY PROCEED ON DIRECT. 
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ADDENDUM NO. I l l : 
HOUSE BILL 36 
Enrolled Copy H,B* 36 
REVISION OF ALIMONY STANDARDS 
1995 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sponsor: J. Brent Haymond 
AN ACT RELATING TO DIVORCE; PROVIDING STANDARDS FOR DETERMINATION 
OF ALIMONY. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
30-3-5, as last amended by Chapter 284. Laws of Utah 1994 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah 
Section 1. Section 30-3*5 is amended to read: 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and 
children - Division of debts - Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and visitation 
- Determination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification* 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the 
following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase 
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent 
children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the 
court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current 
addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
H.B.36 Enrolled Copy 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 
5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after January i, 1994, that 
arc subject to income withholding, an order assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month 
check processing fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery 
Services within the Department of Human Services for the purposes of income withholding in 
accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning 
financial responsibility for ail or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent 
children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent If the court determines 
that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared 
for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide [the-day] child care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for [the 
support and maintenance of the parties,] the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, [or the] apdfor distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other members of the 
immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court 
may include in an order establishing a visitation schedule a provision, among other things, 
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this 
chapter. 
Enrolled Copy H.B. 36 
[(6) Any ordcf of the court that a- party- pay-alimony to a former 3pousc terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the fornicr jpouac io residing with a person of the 
opposite \cx> However, if it ia further established by the person receiving alimony that that 
relationship or association vi without any sexual contact, payment of alimony ahall resume.] 
[irh] (5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a court 
order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pav the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without 
merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
[f$)J {£} If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by a parent, 
a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a 
visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party 
costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
(T> to The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimonv: 
'(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning rapacity or ability to nrodgee income; 
fiii) the abilny of the payor gxrosc to provide swport; and 
(iv> the length of the marriage, 
ft?) The <nm may consider the favlt of the garttes in tacnrnnto&alunpny. 
to As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, gristing at the time of 
separation, in determining alimonv in accordance with Subsection to. However, the court shall 
consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony qn tfte 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no chi|frCT 
have been conceived or bom during the marriage, the court mav consider the standard of living that 
qcfotgd at the time of the mgtriage. 
(d\ The court mav. under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parti^ 
repwtiy* standard? of living-
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a maior change in the 
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income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall he cnw<irf»r»H 
in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earing 
capacity has been greatlv enhanced through the efforts of hoth spouses during the marriage fre f"»" 
mav make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony 
ffl In determining alimonv when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have 
been conceived or bom during the marriage, the court mav consider restoring each party to the 
condition which existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders 
regarding alimonv based on a substantial material change in ciraimstances not fnrseeable at the time 
of the divorce. 
f ifi The court mav not modify alimonv or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of 
the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating 
circumstances that justify that action. 
(m\ In determining alimonv. the income of anv subsequent spouse of the pavor mav not he 
considered, except as provided in this subsection 
(A) The court mav consider the subsequent spouse's financial ahilitv to share living 
expenses, 
(B) The court mav consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the 
payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration 
<h) Alimonv mav not he ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at anv time prior to termination of alimonv. the court fimfr extenuating 
circumstances that justify the payment of alimonv for a longer period of time. 
(81 Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, anv order of the court th*f 
a party oav alimonv to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former 
spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ah initio, payment of alimony 
shall resume if the party navinp alimonv is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights 
are determined. 
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establishment hv the oartv paving alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with anyfar 
person. 
Section 2. Legislative intent. 
Ft is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of alimony based on cohabitation 
with another person in accordance with Subsection 30-3-5(91 be interpreted in any way to 
condone such a relationship for any purpose. 
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ADDENDUM NO. IV; 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. 
§ 78-32.12.2 
History: C. 1953,78-32-12.1, enacted by L. The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993, 
1991, ch. 179, § 1; 1992, ch. 253, § 4; 1993, substituted "shall" for "may" in Subsections (1), 
ch. 152, § 4. (5), and (8); inserted "a minimum of 10 hours 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- of in Subsections (l)(a) and (5Xa), substituted 
ment, effective April 27, 1992, rewrote Subsec- "sanctions" for "penalties" and inserted "in Sec-
tion (9), which had provided for a Child Custody tion 78-32-12.2" in Subsection (8); and made 
Enforcement Account. stylistic changes. 
78-32-12.2. Definitions — Sanctions. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Make up visitation" means visitation which is: 
(i) of the same type and duration of visitation as that which was 
denied, including visitation during weekdays, weekends, holidays, 
and during extended visitation periods; 
(ii) to be made up within one year after the court has entered its 
order of make up visitation; and 
(iii) in the manner chosen by the aggrieved parent if it is in the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) "Petition" means a petition brought by a parent, a grandparent as 
provided in Section 30-5-2, by other immediate family members, or upon 
the court's own motion alleging that a parent is not complying with a 
visitation order in a decree of divorce or a subsequent visitation enforce-
ment order which may be brought at different stages in the alleged pattern 
of noncompliance: 
(i) a first petition is a petition to enforce an original order of 
visitation or a petition filed after three years from the last visitation 
enforcement order; 
(ii) a second petition is a petition filed within three years following 
entry of the first visitation enforcement order; and 
(iii) a third petition is a petition filed within three years following 
entry of the second visitation enforcement order. 
(c) "Substantial noncompliance" means conduct which: 
(i) substantially interferes with a court ordered visitation schedule; 
or 
(ii) interferes with parent's right to frequent, meaningful, and 
continuing access with his child and which substantially impairs that 
parent-child relationship. 
(d) "Visitation enforcement order" means an order to enforce compli-
ance with an original visitation order through the use of sanctions. 
(2) Upon a first petition, the court shall order: 
(a) if the first petition is uncontested, by default: 
(i) a permanent injunction enjoining the noncompliance with the 
court's visitation order; 
(ii) make up visitation for the aggrieved parent and child; and 
(iii) participation in workshops, classes, or individual counseling to 
educate the parent about the importance of complying with the court 
order and providing the child with a continuing relationship with both 
parents as provided in Subsection 78-32-12.l(l)(b); or 
(b) if the first petition is contested, the court shall hold a hearing to 
determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether there has been a 
substantial noncompliance with the visitation order. 
(3) Upon a finding of substantial noncompliance, the court shall order: 
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(a) actual costs including actual attorney fees and court costs to the 
prevailing party; 
(b) make up visitation for the aggrieved parent and child; 
(c) a minimum of 10 hours of community service as provided in 
Subsection 78-32-12. l(l)(a); and 
(d) a permanent injunction enjoining the noncompliance with the 
court's visitation order. 
(4) Upon a finding of substantial noncompliance, the court may order: 
(a) mediation with the requirement to report back to the court on the 
results of mediation within 30 days; 
(b) participation in workshops, classes, or individual counseling to 
educate the parent about the importance of complying with the court order 
and providing the child with a continuing relationship with both parents 
as provided in Subsection 78-32-12.l(l)(b); or 
(c) a fine or jail sentence or other appropriate sanctions as provided 
under contempt of court in Section 78-32-10. 
(5) Upon a second petition, the court shall order: 
(a) if the second petition is uncontested, by default: 
(i) actual costs including actual attorney fees and court costs; 
(ii) make up visitation to be provided for the aggrieved parent and 
child; 
(hi) a minimum of 10 hours of community service as provided in 
Subsection 78-32-12.1(l)(a); and 
(iv) impose a fine or jail sentence or other appropriate sanctions as 
provided under contempt of court in Section 78-32-10; or 
(b) if the second petition is contested, the court shall hold a hearing to 
determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether there has been a 
substantial noncompliance with the visitation orders. 
(6) Upon a finding of a substantial noncompliance, the court shall order: 
(a) actual costs including actual attorney fees and court costs to the 
prevailing party; 
(b) make up visitation to be provided for the aggrieved party and child 
at twice the amount of time previously wrongfully denied and under the 
same conditions as provided in Subsections 78-32-12.2(3)(a) through (c); 
(c) a minimum of 20 hours of community service as provided in 
Subsection 78-32-12.1(l)(a); 
(d) a contempt order which imposes a fine or jail sentence as provided in 
Section 78-32-10; and 
(e) the violator to post bond or security in the amount determined by the 
court to insure future compliance. 
(7) The court may impose additional sanctions which may include any 
additional remedies, terms, or conditions which are consistent with the court's 
previous order. 
(8) Upon a third petition, the court shall order: 
(a) if the third petition is uncontested, by default: 
(i) actual costs including actual attorney fees and court costs; 
(ii) make up visitation to be provided for the aggrieved party and 
chiM at twice the amount of time previously denied and under the 
same conditions as provided in Subsections 78-32-12.2(3)(a) through 
(0 ; 
(hi) a minimum of ten hours of community service as provided in 
Subsection 78-32-12.1(l)(a); and 
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(iv) impose a fine or jail sentence or other appropriate sanctions as 
provided under contempt of court in Section 78-32-10; or 
(b) if the third petition is contested, the court shall hold a hearing to 
determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether there has been a 
substantial noncompliance with the visitation orders. 
(9) Upon a finding of substantial noncompliance, the court shall order: 
(a) actual costs including actual attorney fees and court costs to the 
prevailing party; 
(b) a finding that there has been a prima facie showing of a substantial 
change of circumstances which is against the best interest of the child for 
purposes of modification of custody and order a temporary change of 
custody for a duration to be determined by the court; and 
(c) a finding that there has been a probable cause showing of custodial 
interference as provided in Section 76-5-303 and order the case to be 
referred to the county attorney for prosecution. 
(10) The court may decline to issue an order with the alternative sanctions 
as provided in Subsections 78-32-12.2(2) through (9) although the petitioner 
has met his burden of proof if the court provides findings on the record 
explaining why a sanction or sanctions were not imposed. 
(11) The noncustodial parent shall give the court and the custodial parent 
written notice of his intention to exercise the make up visitation at least seven 
days before the proposed visit if it is to be on a weekday or weekend, and at 
least 30 days before the proposed visit if it is to be on a holiday or an extended 
visitation period. 
(12) The court shall suspend any proceedings under Section 78-32-12.2 if 
substantial allegations of child abuse or child sexual abuse are under investi-
gation or a case is pending in the courts on the allegations. 
(13) The filing of any petition under this section which is found to be without 
merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith shall be subject to 
sanctions as determined by the court. 
(14) This section shall be implemented only as a pilot program in the first 
judicial district as provided in Section 78-32-12.3. 
History: C. 1953,78-32-12.2, enacted by L. became effective on May 3, 1993, pursuant to 
1993, ch. 152, § 5. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 152 
